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THE GROWTH OF IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY IN JAPAN 
AND THE PROBLEM OF RA WMA TERIALS (I) 
By 
Kazuichiro Ono* and Heitaro Namba** 
FOREWORD. 
The histry of iron and steel industry in Japan can be called a history 
of the development of capitalism in Japan, for this industry represents 
and embodies every phase and problems of capitalism in Japan. 
Due to the limited space we cannot describe every phase and aspect 
of our iron and steel industry because it naturally contains all the tangled 
and multifarious problems involved in the birth and growth of the capi-
talistic institution in this country. The present study, therefore, is confined 
to a consideration of the problems of raw materials of this. industry. 
Let us look at history of iron and steel industry whose first milestone is 
found in the foundation of the Yawata Iron Works, and placing the 
emphasis on the problem of how the issue of raw materials was handled. 
1. Birth of Iron and Steel Industry and Its Significance. 
Toward the closing years of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the feudalism 
in Japan was under the throe of political crisis in the face of pressure 
from a succession of farmers' riots, on one hand, and, from the mounting 
inroads of capitalistic influences of Western Powers, on the other. Under 
the circumstances, the government leaders at that tim·e felt that imple-
mentation of the military power of Japan was the paramount needs of the 
time. It was natural, then, that munitions industry, in the last years of 
the feudalistic Shogunate, was developed spurred by a positive assistance 
rendered by the government leaders. This particular· branch of industry, 
thus, was far ahead of all other branches of industrial activities. 
The new Restoration Government of Meiji, in its turn, had to tackle 
the problem of strengthening Japan's fighting power. The newborn Meiji 
* The author is lecturer of Economics at Kyoto University 
** The author is a menber of Kyoto -University Economic Society 
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regime, in its essence, was semi-feudalistic absolutism, and, was never free 
from a semi-feudalistic sway in the Agricultuare. Moreover, Japan, at that 
tiine, was as semi-colonial as she had been prior to the Restoration. The 
urgent demand for" the implementation of the country's military power 
called for the establishment of a modern munitions industry. It was, then, 
evident that the first problem to be tackled by the embryonic Meiji regime 
was to place Japan's munitions industry upon a firm basis, and at the 
same time to encourage the development of otner modern industries. 
However, two powerful restraints confronted it : the first was the unfavo-
rable tariff rates, unilaterally imposed upon Japan by virtue of the inter-
national obligations resulting, indirectly from japan's failure to observe 
the provisions of the Ansei Treaty of 1858, and, directly, from the second 
attempt by the Choshu clan to drive away foreign vessels from its territo-
rial waters at point of artillery fire (1864). ' This unfavorable tariff rates 
actually revealed the position Japan held in the international family of 
nations at that time, for the unilateral tariff pact imposed upon her also 
provided for fhe enlargement of foreign settlements at various places in 
the country and for extraterritoriality for foreign residents and granting 
of most-favored nation clauses to local foreign traders. The second was 
the scantiness of capital accumulation for production, and also the pre-
manufacture period technical level of the country which also served to in-
dicate the low internation position of Japan. 
The trade agreement affixed to the Treaty of Friendship and Com-
merce concluded in 1858 with Britain, the United States, France, Russia 
and the Netherlands stipulated that the import tariffs to be fixed at 35% 
at the. maximum and 5 % at the minimum, and that, unless otherwise 
provided for, the rate tb be 20 % advalorem. The pact also pledged that 
the ports of Kanagawa, Niigata and Hyogo, in addition to Shimada and 
Hakodate, to be opened for foreign trade. The Tokugawa Government, 
however, was not in a position to act according to the treaty provisions 
because the anti-foreign sentiments among the people were overwhelmingly 
powerful and the Government could not afford to ignore the trend. The 
Government, indeed, had to ask for the postponement of the payment of 
the indemnify for the bombardment of foreign vessels by the Choshu clan. 
The foreign Powers concerned eventually acquiesced to this. The Govern-
ment, however, had to pay a high price for this: the foreign powers ob-
tained the pledge, in 1866, that the import tariffs will be lowered to 5 % 
advalorem. The position of Japan, as a matter of fact, was rendered 
much worse than it would appear from this, because, the tariff rate of 
5% advalorem was to be imposed on the basis of the market price at 
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port of export, and, further, because foreign imported articles were often 
reported at a lower price than it actually was quoted at port of export. 
Such practice was then feasible because the actual commercial situation 
prevailing in foreign countries was hard to know. Taking into considera 
tion the frequent rise in prices after import had been effected, the 5% ad 
valorem import duty, substantially, was often less than mere 1 %." And, 
this low rate of import duty was to be applied also to the imports 
from Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Switzerland, Russia, Sweden, 
Norway, Spain, the North German Tariff League and Austria. If was 
obvious that this arrangement, which was undisputably highly unfavorable 
to japan, resulted in a tremendous financial· loss on the part of japan, 
at the same time it placed a gigantic obstacle in the way of the develo-
pment of japan's domestic industries, and this situation was allowed to 
persist for the next thirty years up till the time when auch humiliating 
trea ties were eventually revised." 
It has already been mentioned earlier that the military industry of 
japan was emerging on the fore as early as the Bunkyu era toward the 
closing years of the Tokugawa regime. If was already taking the shape 
of modern mechanized industry. There is no question, however, that it 
still had nothing to compare with the modern industries of advanced Western 
Powers, which had earlier undergone the baptism of Industrial Revolu-
tion, and were, then, fast assuming the aspect of a monopolistic capitalism." 
In a strict sense of the term, the industry of japan at that time, had 
not even reached the stage of manufacturing industry. Under these circu-
Kote: (I.) Refer to page 98, "Japan's Tariffs", by T6a Keizai Ch6sa KyoKu- the East 
Asia Economic Investigation Bureau. The situation then was, that not only the, import 
duty but all the routine business of the customs offices could not be carried out unless 
approved by the respective foreign ministers statoned in Japan. 
(2.) The exreaterritorialityand foreign settlements were terminated in 1899. Foreign armed 
forces were stationed in Japan between 1863 and 1875. Foreign trade Was substantially 
in the hands of resident foreign traders up till the time of the much-debated revision of 
treaties. The following table indicates the Jpercentage of exports and imports of Japan 
handeled by foreign Japanese traders.: * 
year I export I import 
I foreign \ Japanese I foreign I Japanese traders traders traders traders 
1874 99.5 
I 
0.5 99.97 0.03 
IBB9 81. 6 IB.4 70.B 29.2 
1900 62.9 37. I 60.6 39.4 
1901 75.2 
I 
24.B 63.0 37.0 
1911 48.5 51. 5 36.2 63.B 
*' These figures are from Asahi Shim bun Sha: Nippon Kdzai S6kan.-General Statistics 
of Japanese Economy 1930. 
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mstances, the policy taken by the new Meiji Government to encourage 
and foster the growth of domestic industries tended to place emphasis 
on the speedy introduction into the country, of the advanced industrial 
technique of the Western Powers rather than to subsidize her existing 
industries. This vast difference in the level of the industrial development. 
at the same time was accompanied with a similar difference in the qualit-
ative capabilities of available labor, and this proved to be a handicap 
in the government's plan to have imported Western industrial establisement 
firmly installed in Japan . 
. Thus, it is seen that the Meiji regime, working under such adverse 
conditions, could not resort to the protective tariff system for the purposes 
of protecting domestic industries. This may compare, with a striking cont-
rast, with the case of Germany and the United States, which, as far. as 
international trade was concerned, were still somewhat behind the other 
Western Powers at that time, but boldly resorted to a protective measure, 
which not only helped to increase their respective national revenue but 
also went a long way toward accumulating their respective capital assets.') 
These circumstances naturally made it unavoidable that many of Japan's 
industries relied on a direct govenment subsidy and consequently took on 
the shape of government-confralled enterprises. This tendency was more 
pronounced in the military industry, as would be naturally presumed. 
The following is a chronological survey of the mejor military indus-
tries forrun or controlled by the government from 1866 to 1890: 
1866. The government establishes iron works at Yokosuka and Yoko-
hama. In 1870 these were placed under the control of the Ministry of 
Industry, and, in 1872, under the control of the Ministry of Navy. The 
Sekiguchi Works was established, which, in 1879, became the Tokyo Ar-
(3.) Refer to the following comparision between the Nagasaki Iron Works, one of the leading 
iron manufacturing plants in Japan at that time, and the Krupp Factory of Germany: 
steam engine HP furnaces forgery I steam tools labor Krupp hammer 
(1862) 32 1236 161 49 
1 
14 203 2400 
Nagasaki 1 










(4.) When a feudalistic nation advances into a modern capitalistic one usually the policies 
of colonialism, taxation, i::;sue of national bonds and industrial protection are com-
binedly taken. In the case of Japan, she was not in a position to resort to the policy 
of colonialism and of a protective tariH', and her main source of taX revenue was land 
taxes. This is strik;ngly compared with the case of the United States, where, during 1789 
(the year of the promulgation of the Constitution) and 1860, more than 90 % of her tax 
revenue came from tariffs. In Germany, tOOt tariff revenue occupied more than a half 
of the total tax revenue up till 1907. 
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senal. The Nagasaki Iron Works was established, which, in 1871, was 
placed under the control of the Ministry of Industry, renamed the Naga-
saki Shipbuilding Plant. The Ishikawajima Shipbuilding Plant was esta-
blished, whice, in 1874, was merged with the Naval Arsenal. 
1870. The Munitions Company was established. This, in 1879, be-
came the Osaka Arsenal. 
1874. The Kamaishi Mines was placed under government control. 
The Naval Weapons Manufacturing Plant was established at Tsukiji, Tokyo. 
This, in 1879, was renamed Naval Arseoal. 
1882. The Krupp-stype Crucible steel manufacturing plant was establ-
ished at Tsukiji, the first of Western-style steel making. 
1884. The Osaka Arsenal imported from Europe the steel and copper 
gun compression machines. 
1885. The Hyogo Shipbuilding Bureau imported from England iron 
vessel manufacturing machines. 
1887. (Tanaka Iron Works. at Kamaishi was founded. The Tokyo 
Steel Manufacturing Company was established.) 
1890. The Navy installed the Siemens-stype steel manufacturing fur-
nace at the Yokosuka Arsenal. A 200 k.g. steel manufacturing furnace 
was installed at the Osaka Arsenal, which marked the beginning of the 
steel manufacturing enterprise at the hands of the Army .. 
These instances of the successive establishment of military factories 
under government control as well as the importation of machinery from 
foreign countries and the employment of foreign technicians') at these plants 
were a manifestation, of the policy of the Meiji regime to speedily foster 
and implement the military industries of a modernizing Japan. 
In spite of all these forbidding restraints, the Meiji government, slowly 
but steadily, succeeded in the projected implementation of Japan's mili-
tary power. To exemplify this, the following may be cited: 
(1) In 1880 the Murata infantry rifle was adopted as the standard 
weapon for the Japanese army. With the adoption in 1885 of the improved 
Murata infantry rifle, the Japanese army was for the first time equipped 
with the uniform weapon, and the credit went to the Tokyo Army Arsenal, 
where "experienced workmen could manufacture scores of standard rifles 
after the installation of machines." 
(5~) The first instances of employing foreign technicians in an effort to make up for the 
deficient technical knowledge on the part of the Japanese were seen as early as 1856 (Na-
gasaki Iron Works) and 1865 (Yokosuka and Yokohama Iron Works,). It is noteworthy 
that the practice persisted until 1891 (Yawata Seitelsu Sho-Yawata Iron Works) and 1913 
(Nippon K6kan Co.-Nippon Steel Tube Co.). 
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(2) The systematic study of the manufacturing of artillery weapons 
was started in 1880. In 1883, the adoption of the Italian-style 7 c.m. 
field guns and mountain guns, l2c.m. cannons· and 15 c.m. mortars were 
decided. By the end of 1886,all the field artillery corps in the country 
were supplied. with these artilleries. The Osaka Arsenal. which undertook 
the manufacture of these artillery pieces, had the 200 k.g. steel manufactu-
ring furnace installed for the first time in 1890. In the following year 
the capacity of the furnace was increased up to 600 k.g. 
(3) With regards to naval weapons, it is recorded that the Naval 
Arsenal, in 1881, had steel manufacturing and forging plants installed, 
and, during 1883-1885, they could manufacture guns with the steel manu-
factured at these plants. In 1887, the furnace underwent a remodelling, 
and, durIng 1889-1892 steel material for two 47 m.m. rapid firers was 
successfully cast and forged at the Naval Arsenal. 
(4) In 1885 Yokosuka Arsenal, which engaged in building of naval 
vessels, sent a group of workmen to the Krupp in Germany to study the 
method of manufacturing iron and steel. In August, 1890, it decided to 
purchase from the Crusot Company in France two furnaces for casting 
steel. The Siemens-style furnace was thus established using heavy oil as 
its fuel, and in 1892, all the main boilers and. engines of warship Akitsu-
shima were manufactured with the steel made in Japan. 
(5) In 1890 it was proved that the cast ironnianufactured at Kama-
ishi was "somewhat superior in quality" to the Gregorini cast iron of 
Italy, and, after this, the cast iron manufactures in our country was used 
in manufacturing various categories of weapons. 
It was then recognised that the establishment of a modern large-scale 
iron manufacturing indurtry was of· utmost importance in order to systmise 
and organise these technical successes into a modern military force with 
support of a capitalistic economy in its background.') Thus, as early as 
(6) That the iron works was directly under government control was due not only to the 
necessity of securing sufficient military power but· also to various other factors. First, 
the fact may be cited that big capitalists in Japan, while aggressively embarking on t~e 
field of mining and metallurgical ibdustries, had not yet taken up the iron and pIg 
iron manufactruing. The reason for this, which seems to be strange seeing that the phe-
nomenal development of industrial capital had brought about a remarkable increase of 
the import of steel to meet a mounting demand should be found in the fact that the 
industrial capitalists, while taking lessons from the failure of the ,government. controlled 
iron works at Kamaishi and N akakosaka as well as the failure of the civilian-managed 
Kippon Seitetsu Gaisha-Japan Iron Manufacturing Company in 1891, were not sure of 
successfully running the enterprises in competition with cheap imported pig iron and steel. 
A second factor may be found in the fact that, because the iron manufacturing industry 
required large capital investment, the superiority of the available cheap labor would 
unavoidably be offset to a large extent to the disadvantage of the investors and that .Japan-
ese capitalists, who still retained much of the properties of commercial capitalists, dld not 
naturally find such investment altogether attractive. 
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1880, the Ministries of Army and Navy and the Ministry of Industry 
made a· joint petition for the establishment of a government managed 
iron manufacturing plant. In 1891, the Ministry ·of Navy submitted to 
the second session of the Diet a bill for fouding a governmental iron works 
with the capacity of producing 30,000 tons of steel per year, and the same 
bill was submitted for the second time to the third session of the Diet in 
the following year. 
However the founding of a large-scale modern iron works was not 
possible by military requisites alone. The birth of a governmental iron 
works was made possoble through, the ordeal of the Sino-japanese War 
which brought about a general maturity of the industrial capital of japan. 
In 1895, the eighth Diet for the first time moved to approve the bill for 
founding the iron works. In the following year, the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Commercd inaugurated. It was only in 1901 that the first fur-
nace of the Yawata Seitetsu Sho-Yawata Iron Works statted operation. 
Thus, it is seen that a modern large-scale iron ane steel works first 
came into being in japan coincident with a general growth of the capitalistic 
system spurred on by her victory in the aggressive war with China. 
Viewed in a political light, on the other hand, it was brought by the 
dirty compromise between the government and the Diet (or absQlutism 
and bourgeosie). The international situation, which was then witnessing 
a rapid unfurling of imperialism, proved a further stimulant favoring it. 
lt may also be said that a firm substantiation and growth of industrial 
capitalism in japan was possible only on the premise that large-scale 
modern iron and steel works was duly in being. 
While it is evident that military requirements always worked in the 
background of the energetic expansion of the steel industry in this country, 
as is witnessed in the successive petitions to the Diet in 1880, 1891 and 
1892, the Bill for the establishment of a government-operated iron works, 
submitted to the ninth session of the Diet in 1896, immesiately after the 
Sino-japanese War, should be noted with special significance as indicating 
the same requirements beyond any shadow of doubt. The explanation 
given by the government authorities in introducing the Bill, ran, in part, 
as follows: 
': "The need has long been felt, from the industrial as well as military 
points of view,.for the founding of an iron works, and, now, no further 
delay shall be allowed. Toward the end of last year, demand rapidly 
rose ~or steel, which was in such a dire scarcity, while it is easily predic-
t~ble that the demand may further increase to meet industrial as well as 
military needs. Unless steps are taken immedeately more natural resources 
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of the country would be bound to flow out, not to speak of the predica-
ment foreseen in the projected expansion of the nation's military prepare-
dness. Suppose the nation faces an emergency now. If no supply is to 
be expected on the domestic market, and, if, again, no supply is to come 
from overseas, it would simply be inevitable for the nation to face. a for-
midable difficulty, because all the arsenals and shipbuilding yards in the 
country would just be useless in the face of a total lack of the supply of 
iron and steel. Thus, it goes without saying that an expansion. of arma-
ment should be preceded by a speedy inauguration of a modern iron and 
steel manufacturing plant .... " 
This shows that the birth of the Yawata Iron Works marked establish-
ment of firm foundation of Japan's modern military organisation, including 
the key-industries, which are essential for the strengthening of her mili-
tary potentiality. Especially, it should be noted, in this connection, that 
the growth of Japan's industrial capitalism was always preceded by military 
as well as economic requirements. The initial budget appropriations for 
the fouding of the Yawata Iron Works amounted to ¥4,090,000, and the 
total expenditures needed for its actual founding ran int ¥20,000,000 
(including ¥ 580,000 appropriated from the indemnity paid by China as a 
result of her defeat in the Sino-Japanese War). The Yawata started ope-
ration in February, 1901. The following Table No. 1 shows how its pro-
duction rose by each year. 
Table I. (Unit 1,000 ton) 
I 1901 I 1903 I 1904 I 1905 I 1906 
.Pig I Rolledl ::ig IRolledl . Pig IRolledl . Pig 'IRolledl . Pig I Rolled 
Iron steel non steel Iron steel Iron steel U'on steel 
Yawata A 30 5 
-
39 33 58 88 65 '101 66 
Domestic B 57 6 30 40 68 60 79 71 145 69 
AlB 
I 
53 I 83 I 
I 
98 I 49 
I 
97 IUn I 92 
I 
70 I 96 % % % - % % % known % % % 
.. Remark (I)-The above Table quotes the figures mentIOned In the 1918 edItIon of the 
Data concerning Iron Manufacturing Industry. 
(2) Production of pig iron at Yawata was suspended between July 28, 1902 and 
July 22, 1904. 
The ,above Table clearly indicates what importance the Yawata oc-
cupied in the domestic production of iron and steel. Wqat is moreirn-
portant, however, is the fact that after 1901, the year when it began opera-
tion, the production of pig iron in Japan rose above the amount .of that 
imported from abroad. It is thus, seen, that the iron and steel industry 
in Japan was placed on a firm foundation for the first time following the 
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founding of the Yawata Iron Works. 
It should be moted, however, that this simply meant that a founda-
tion for japan's steel industry had been laid, but not that the industry 
was firmly established. For instance, it is recorded that the domestic pro-
duction of cotton yarns and cloth, both representatative of the consumer 
commodities, was more than their imports as early as 1885 in the case of 
cotton cloth production and cotton yarn production surpassed its imports 
in 1890. This offers a sharp contrast to the case of pig iron and steel, 
for the domestic production of pig iron surmounted its imports only in 
1901, as mentioned above, and, that of rolled steel production as late as 1925 
(refer to Table 3). Thus, following the successive expansion of the Ya-
wata Iron Works in the 1890's, the merger of the Nippon Chuca-Sho 
(cast iron works) in the Sumitomo financial clique in 1901, the Japanese 
victory in the Russo-Japanese War, and the founding of the Kobe Seika 
Sho (Kobe Steel works) in 1905, the subsequent years up till the end of the 
Meiji era was marked with successful establishment of the Nippon Seika-Sho 
Uapan steel works) (1907), the Wanishi Seitetsu Co. (iron and steel) (1909), 
Nippon Kakan Co. (Nippon steel tube Co.) (1912) and the Penshihu Iron and 
Steel Co. in Manchuria (1911). With these step-by-stEP progresses marking 
the growth of Japan's iron and steel industry under civilian control, the indu-
stry was eventually firmly established during and after the first World War. 
Table 2. Domestic Production of Pig 
Iron and Its Imports (Unit 
ton) 
J Production I Imports 
1893 16,074 I 23,285 
1900 23,303 23, 756 
1901 56,834 43, 160 
1902 39,604 29,939 
I 
Table 3. Production of Rolled Steel 
and Its Imports (Unit ton) 
I Production I Imports 
1901 6,033 159,285 
1924 841,347 1,099,243 
1925 1,042,978 523,268 
1927 1,256,302 948, 116 
2, Problem of Raw Materials. 
I. The Early Iron-Steel Industry in Japan and Iron Ores. 
In the early years of Meiji, practically' no investigation had been con-
ducted on the resources of iron ores in the country, the volume of the 
deposited resources left untapped was only a guess work. It was apparently 
understood generally, however, that the country had a rich deposit of iron 
ores. Toru Yoshii, the then deputy director of the Bureau of Mining, in 
1874, referring to the project for establishing a government-operated min-
ing factory at Kamaishi, is said to have advised that" our country is rich 
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in coal and iron resources and if these resources are properly mined aiid 
processed, they will not only be enough to meet the domestic demand 
but alSo have a capablity of being exported." Further more the Ministries 
of Army, Navy and Industry, made a jointly statement advising the 
founding of a comprehensive iron manufacturing plant, in 1880, which 
partly rau as follows: "Although this country has bountiful reSoilrces 
of coal and iron, we have not yet sufficiently developed the iron manufac-
turing industry .... " Possibly these statements were made with an 
eye to the resources of iron sands reportedly found in the Chugoku 
district in western Japan. No concrete data on these resources, however, 
Table 4. Comparison of Pig Iron Out- are in evidence, and, therefore, no exact 
put at Kamaishi and in Chugoku estimate of the deposited volume of such 
District (Unit ton) 
I 
Kamishi I Chugoku 
1887 1,492 10,153 
1890 3,864 13,592 
1892 6,913 9,003 
1894 12, 735 8, ll5 
1897 16,098 7,826 
Table 5. Comparison of Price of pig 
Iron, Domestice and Imported. 
(Yen per 100 kin) 
I Domestic I 
Imported 
Pig Iron 
1877 1. 33 1. 15 
1878 
- 0.95 
1879 1. 60 0.97 
1880 2.24 0.94 
1881 2.40 0.88 
1882 1. 65 1. 19 
1883 1. 23 0.95 
1884 0.91 0.90 
1885 - 1.13 
1886 - 0.86 
resources is possible. It is recorded that, 
up till the 1880's, the output of pig 
iron manufactured from the iron sands 
mined in the Chugoku district was more 
than that produced at Kamaishi, where 
the Westernstyle iron manufacturing 
process had been adopted (refer Table 
4). 
It should be noted, however, that 
the iron sands refining process employed 
in the Chugoku district was so old-
fashioned and primitive, little improved 
from what had been handed down thr-
ough generations, that, although the cost 
per ton of the iron sands was actually 
below that of iron ores produced in the 
Western countries, the finished iron and 
steel product, had to be quoted at a 
price considerably higher than that of 
Western-produced iron and steel. (refer 
* -unknown Table 5) 
Around 1884, various domestic iron manufacturers had to complain 
of difficulties, which was largely due to the increasing pressure being ex-
erted by the imported iron. In spite of this, the Ministry of Navy had 
earlier instructed that domestic iron ores be utilised as far as possible. 
However, the fact was that the Kamaishi Iron Works, the practically sole 
source of the supply of pig iron at that time, faced an extreme difficulty 
in maintaining operation. Under these circumstances, refining of ironsands 
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was continued under the close cooperation of the Naval Arsenal and the 
Yokosuka Naval Arsenal and was capable of competing with the Western-
style blast-furnace refining process. With the technical and mannagerial 
improvement at Kamaishi, the volume of ironsands refining gradually fell, 
and, after the latter part of the 1890's, it had to fall out of the compe-
ting ranks and reduced to the status of a mere local industry. The same 
applied to the Hiroshima Iron Works; it had to be sold to a private 
enterpriser in 1904. 
That the traditional japanese iron (iron sands) refining process had 
to give way to the Western refining methods in the 1880's is significant, 
first, as indicating the introduction of the Western-style iron manufacturing 
industry and the successful installation of modern equipment (in the sense 
that the modern production method, in this case, was not implanted on 
an improved version of the traditional one), and, secondly, as pointing to 
the fact that domestic competitors were mercelessly expelled from the 
market in the course of such introduction and installation, and, thirdly, 
as showing the tendency in which the iron sands resources, which had 
previously constituted the major portion of iron resources in the country, 
were going to be discarded and give way to the iron ores. This is com-
parable to the case of " Gara B6-J apanese original spinning manufacture." 
which flourished and, then, declined between 1877 and 1887. Technically 
speaking, however, this similarity ceases just at this point. In the case of 
"Gara Bo," an improved technique was an addition to the traditional 
method; in the case of the iron sands, however, the old manufacturing 
process had simply given way to an improved modern method before it 
could ever invent an innovation. 
Thus, after the latter part of the 1880's iron sands were discarded as 
the material for iron and steel, and the iron ores began to appear on the 
stage substituting them. 
Were, them, iron ore resources in japan, excluding iron sands, plen-
tiful? 
It has already been stated that, prior to the founding of the Yawata 
Iron Works, the Kamaishi Works had practically monopolized the Western 
process of iron refining in japan. This was due to the fact that the Ka-
rnaishi area produced iron ores and that the Kamaishi Works, operated 
on these ores as its supply. Its operation however, was under constant 
difficulties ever since its foundation, and it came to such extreme that 
in 1883 its operation was temporarily suspended. One of the biggest factors 
:()f this operational suspension was the acute shortage of the iron resources. 
In 1883, a report was made public to the effect that the iron deposits in 
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the Kamaishi mines amounted to mere 130,000 tons. This revelation 
served to cast a pessimistic shadow on the future prospects of theh-on 
and steel industry iIi Japan . 
. On the other hand, the military authorities, naturally, had long since 
projecte~ a plan calling for the self-supply of iron and steel, and, as early 
as 1883, these authorities, together with the Ministry of Industry, took 
steps to advise the Government on the urgency of inaugurating an iron 
manufacturing company under direct Government control. With the open~ 
ing of the Diet in 1890, bills for the establishment of such iron works 
were submitted one after another. The first of these bills was introduced 
to the second session of the Diet in 1891 and the second to the third ses-
sion in the following year. Both bills were rejected by the House of Re-
presentatives, the ostensible reason for the rejection being that no adequate 
investigation of iron and steel material was then available. 7) 
This indicates that, up till the time the Yawata Iron Works was foun-
ded, the biggest problem facing the iron and steel industry of the conutry 
was the shortage of the material resources as well as the insufficient investiga-
tion. In view of this, the government, after the close of the third session 
af the Diet, took steps to set up a special commission to conduction in-
vestigations on the steel industry, placing special emphasis on objestive here 
the research of iron material resources available for the all-important indu-
stry. Finally, the comnnission reported that beride the 14,000,000 ton 
iron ore deposits at Kamaishi, there is an estimate of 370000, ton deposits 
at Akatani (in Niigata Prefecture), another 840,000 ton deposits at Senninyama 
(in Iwate pref.) and also a estimate of 400,000 ton of iron sand deposits in 
Hokkaido. With the ores and iron sands mined at these planes alone, the 
Commission comented that, production of 7,360,000 tons of pig iron would 
be possible. The commission also reported that a number of other places could 
be located in the country where big iron ore deposits may be found. The 
conclusion reached by this commission, was that there was no need for 
a pessimistic view with regard to the iron ore deposits in the country. 
The initial investigation in the field of iron ore resources was followed 
by a series of further investigation of manufacturing methods of iron and 
steel and system of iron works, etc. These, eventually culminated in the 
(7) The failure of the Diet to fully recognise the necessity of establishing an iron manufac-
turing plant was responsible for the repeated rejection of the bills submitted to the Diet 
urging the founding of such plant. Further, the time coincided with an acute business 
depression immediately following the panic of 1890, when demand in general was at the 
lowest. Following a general business recovery in 1892 and the Sino-Japanese War, of 
1894-95, the eighth session of the Diet in 1895, took the initiative to propose the founding 
a government-operated iron works. 
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presentation to the Diet of a bill for establishing a government-controlled 
iron plant. In May, 1896, the bill. was passed by the House of Representa-
tives, marking a definite milestone in the annals of effort directed toward 
the materialisation of the project. The problem of the raw materials, on 
the other hand, had throughout played a very important part, sometimes 
even threatening a complete impediment of the program. 
Now, let us look at the raw material situation of the Yawata Iron 
Works, which the Goverment had finally decided to establish. Up till 
this time, the iron and steel industry in Japan had largely depended on 
the domestic iron ore supplies. Thisfact, however, did not mean that the 
industry was in any sense independent. On the contrary, as is shown in 
the statistical Table 6, the national pig iron and steel production was 
negligible in volume, when compared with that of imported iron and steel. 
As far as the iron and steel industry was concerned, Japan was then, still 
in a semi-colonial status, offering a highly profitable market for the Wes-
tern capitalistic countries. The project to in augurate an iron plant under 
government-control, indeed, was an endeavor to make herself free of such 
humiliating position. However, in the initial stage, the domestically-pro-
duced iron ores were still to be relied upon. This, primarily, came from 
the desires of the military authorities, who attempted to secure its raw 
Table 6. Volume of Iron and SteeJ, Domestically 




j Pig iron I Rolled steel I Pig iron I Rolled steel 
1874 4,894 1l,548 
1877 8,216 16,536 
.1882 16,263 29,641 
1887 15,267 65,449 
1889 unknown 1,080 9,807 61,482 
1890 II 1,180 10,429 68,330 
1891 II 719 12, 190 59,465 
1892 II 1,135 12,322 36,379 
1893 17,283 808 23,285 36,342 
1894 16,074 1,208 36,649 89,607 
1895 18, 126 1,064 35,315 101,905 
1896 24,663 1,192 39,036 191,299 
1897 26, 122 1,080 43,642 207,444 
1898 22,480 1,100 63,402 228,832 
1899 20,752 908 27,244 120,080 
1900 23,303 970 23, 756 243,532 I 
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materials within the country by developing a number of "bases" of such 
rna terials. S) 
It should be noted, in this connection, that the initial program of 
the Goverment controlled steel mill was to place emphasis on steel manu-
facturing and. roIling fields, while, as for the production pig iron, the 
Goverment plannedtci produce only special purposes pig iron use as the 
material for Bessemer Steel making and let Kamaishi and other factories 
under civilian management mannfacture pig iron for other purposes. 
In the light of such circumstances, the problem of the supply of materials, 
so far as the plant was concerned, was never as urgent as it might appear. 
A rapid increase of the demand on the domestic market, however, caused 
the program to be modified. The capacity of the blast furnace as well as 
the open hearth furnace was markedly expanded. The result was that both 
steel and pig iron came. to be manufactured through a systematically 
integrated process, which, in turn, brought the problem of raw materials 
to the fore with an unprecedented urgency. In view of the new situation, 
Ishiro Wada, the second superintendent of the. Yawata Iron Works, had 
Kamaishi and Senninyama thoroughly investigated The Goverment planed 
to buy up these mines. But, the plan failed to materialise because their owners 
refused. However, it was agreed that certain amount of their ores would 
be supplied each yeai: by Kamaishi. Akatani and Awagatake were still in 
an undeveloped state, and were selected for purchase. The buying of 
Akatani took place in 1899, and ¥ 1,000,000 was invested here for deve-
lopment aimed at an annual production of 100,000 ton of iron ores. 
However, due to a miscalculations in the quality of ore, the process of 
mining, and the installation for transportation caused the program for 
development to be brought to a standstill, with the result that the opera-
tion of the blast furnace at Yawata Iron Works could not be started as 
scheduled. 
The preceding lines have made it clear, it is hoped, that even before 
the commencement of the operation of the Yawata Iron Works, the 
contemplated supply of the domestic iron ores had to face an impasse. 
With this situation serving as a springboard, the schemes for domestic 
exploitation of the iron resources were eventually abandoned. Japan's 
(8) The afore~mentioned 1891-92 program for founding a government-controlled iron 
manufacturing plant had the emphasis placed on the manufactureing of steel and rolled 
steel, while pig iron supply was slated to be imported. However, the program Was 
provisional in nature, for it was envisaged that the establishment and development of 
a domestic steel industry woul,d inevitably give an impetus to the formation of a do-
mestic market for pig iron~ which, would, in its turn, prompt civilian enterprises to em-
bark upon mining and exploiting the untouched resources. In short, the program was 
simply a precursor to such an eventual objective. 
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victory in the Sino-JapaneseWar had prepared the stage, while the 
abandonment of the plan at this juncture signified that further atte-
mpts at surveying the domestic iron ore resources as well as at improving 
the technique involved were to be entirely discarded likewise. In other 
words, this, at the same time, indicated that Japan, under the circumstances, 
had to choose to go along an easier path, which, incidentally, it may be 
asserted, was necessitated under the restraints of the intensifying price 
competition on the international market. It was under such condition 
that the iron and steel industry of Japan was destined to gradually assert 
itself as an eloquent spokesman of the aggressively imperialistic colonial 
policy which she pursued. 
II. Establishment of System for Reliance on and Securing of Imported 
Iron Ores 
a.) The Initial Steps taken in Securing Foreign Iron Ores: 
While the domestic supply of iron ore resources came to a standstill 
in Japan, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, it happend that the 
Hanyang Iron Works in China (then under Ching Chao) had a difficulty 
in respect to the supply of coal. The Hanyang Iron Works, the first of 
modern. industrial establishments in China, was founded in the 17th year 
of Kwanghsu or 1890 to meet economic as well as military requirements 
of the times. To supply iron ores to this Hanyang Iron Works, modern 
iron mines were developed at Tayeh on the Yangtze River, the mining 
operation of which was inaugurated in the ·same year with Hanyang. 
Tayeh iron mines, as was Hanyang Iron Workes was established with the 
assistance of German engineers and had imported Western equipment 
installed. The development of these modern heavy indnstries by China 
with its own capital is noteworthy, for this was indication of the Chinese 
governrnant (Ching Chao) to free its country from the agression of the 
imperialistic Western powers on the China mainland. Despite the inten-
tions and desires of the Chinese government, however, the attempt at 
Hanyang failed. The reason for this is generally understood to lie in 
the following circumstances. The. site of Hanyang had been chosen from 
the' personal conveniences of Chang Chi-tung, Governor of Provinces of 
Hupeh and Hunan, who was the founder of the Iron Works. It was found 
that the geographical conditions of the site were highly unfavorable to 
'a satisfactory operation of the plant. To make the situation much worse, 
.it was found soon after it went into operation that the fuel, coal to be fed 
to the machinery was to be imported all the way fro~W~lesjnEngland. 
This inevitably resulted in a vest financial loss. . Even the govermenta! 
baCkup could not save the situation. 
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More fundamentally, however, the factors which prompted the failure 
of Hanyang should be found in the financial impasse into which· the 
Chinese government had fallen caused by the payment of a big reparation 
to Japan following her defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, and also in a 
drastic decrease in the demand for iron. This can be compared with In 
the case of the Yawata Iron Works, which also encounterd acute techni-
cal and financial difficulties. The situation at Yawata Iron Work was 
rendered so untenable that the accumulated financial deficit up to 1902 
since its inauguration mounted to as high as ¥7,500,000, and, eventually 
the manufacturing of pig iron had to be suspended, temporarily at least. 
However in Japan, the victory in the Sino-Japanese War and the steady 
expansion of her industrial capital, coupled by various favorable political 
and economic factors, eventually made it possible that the impasse be 
overcome. 
The goverment-controlled Hanyang Iron Works, on the other hand, 
faced the tragedy of being dissolved only six years after its inauguration. 
In 1897 it was modified into a commercial concern with civilian capital 
introduced, the management of which was entirely entrusted to Sheng 
HSiian-hwai, a leading chinese businessman of the time. Also, the fuel coal, 
which had hitherto been imported from the far-off England, came to be 
brought from Kaiping in Hopeh Province. The price, however, was ,quoted 
considerably high, mainly due to then high transportation cost involved and 
this made it hard to make both ends meet. The predicament forced Sheng to 
contemplate a plan to exchange Hanyang iron ores with Yawata's coal. 
This plan was first communicated to Superintendent Wada of the Yawata 
Iron Works from Odagiri, the then Japanese consul-general stationed at Shan-
ghai. Wada, upon the receipt of the communication, lost no time in 
confering with Hirobumi Ito, one of the el~er Statesmen, advising the 
latter on the advisability of importing iron ores from China. As a result, 
Ito sailed to Peking in 1899, where he had an audience with the Empress 
Dowager. He also met Chang Chi-tung, who tentatively agreed to the 
sale of Tayeh iron ores in exchange for cokes produced in Japan. Wada, 
then, conferred with Chang Chi-tung and Sheng HSiian-hwai, which 
eventually calminated in the conclusion of a contract in April the same 
year. 
It is undniable that the conclusion of this contract was the immediate 
result of Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War. The contract provided 
for the supply to Japan of 50,000 ton per year of iron ores containing 
60 % of iron component at 2.40 yen per ton. The agreement was to be 
valid for a period of 15 years, while the price would be placed on the 
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same level for two years. The first ship, Akunoura Maru, fully loaded 
with 1,600 tons Tayeh iron ores, disembarked from the wharfs of Tayeh 
on july 4, 1900. This marked the first import of iron ores from China. 
As has previously been .stated, the Yawata Iron Works commenced 
operation on the project that iron ores required would be supplied domes-
tically, however the problem of raw materials comfronting the enterprise 
saw a solution when the prospect opened up for iron ores to be imported 
from China. Furthermore, it was only on this possibility, that a plan of 
expansion at Yawata, far surpassing the original program, was made pos-
sible. 
This fact is highly significant in that japan's iron and steel industry 
was first enabled to stand on its own on the premise that its" colony" 
would serve as a base of supply of iron ores. The import of Chinese iron 
ores was made further easier following the abolishment in 1901 of the 
import duties. This, on the other hand, had the effect of exerting adverse 
influences on Kamaishi, depending on the supply of domestically-produced 
ores, and strengthening the position of ),awata, while, at the same time, 
japan's dependence on foreign iron ores was heightened more and more.'I) 
The abolishment of import duties on iron ores significantly contrasted 
with a similar measure taken in 1896 on the import duties on raw cotton, 
which, together, served to import" low-priced" raw materials from abroad . 
. There, however, was a big difference to be noted. The abolishment of 
import duties on raw cotton signiffed a victory on the part of spinning 
capitalists in their struggle with cotton growers and landowners. The 
spinning capitalists. of course, were not content simply with the purchase 
of raw cotton from the free market. They, on one hand, embarked upon 
the formation of a vast system for the purchase of raw cotton, while, 
on the other, started a vigorous campaign, within less than a few years 
following the abolishment of the import duties, for not only securing the 
cotton-growing lands within the area either under the monopolistic contro 
or with the possibility of coming under their control, but also for improving 
the quality of, and increasing the output of raw cotton. This was for the 
purpose of securing raw materials required for further phenomenal expan-
(9) That the output at Kamaishi, the only civilianmanaged iron manufacturing plant stood 
twenty years after its inauguration interspersed by Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese 
and Russo-Japanese War, at mere 40,000 tons for pig iron and 5,000 tons for steel, was 
due to the fact that it had to fight under a- constant oppression by imported pig iron and 
steel, and, also, that Yawata was in a position to enjoy an advantageous stand by dint of 
low-price iron ores imported from China. Prior to the World War 1, the pig iron manu-
factured at Yawata was quoted at 23.10 yen per ton while that made at Kamaishi was 
quoted at 27.30 yen. 
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sion of Japan's modern industries for imperialigtic ambitions. They, ho-
wever, were not altogether successful in their ambitious enterprise .. ,.Their 
attempts. were. made repeatedly to place direct control on raw cotton 
produced in North Korea and on China mainland. Such attempts at secur-
ing possession of a vast area of lands capable of producing raw materials 
in an amount enough to stand the consumption by the fast-expanding 
spinning industry failed to achieve the expected results due to the opposition 
raised by the agrarian populace .concerned. With regards to the abolish-
ment of import duties on iron ores, on the other hand, facilitating a 
systematic import of iron ores for japan's iron and steel industry, .was 
followed by a direct control on foreign iron ores, mainly in China .. and 
Korea. This, bespeaks the essential requirements for a strengthened Japanese 
military power. It was not merely a question of low-priced raw materials 
and their securing: it was an absolute necessity as well as demand and, in 
order that that demand be fully met, Japan's capital began a vigorous 
movement to flow to China mainland. 
b.) Commencement of Capital Export and Its Progress: 
For Japan's iron and steel industry to successfully compete against 
the mounting oppression exerted by the imperialistic Western Powers,then 
so intent upon dividing up Oriental colonieslOJ, something more positive 
and tangible than a mere abolishment of import duties on iron ores was 
needed so that supply of low-priced raw materials be firmly secured. Positive 
steps had to be taken for the purpose of acquiring for Japan's own needs 
whatever raw materials required. In the face of a vigorous interference by 
Germany with her attempt to purchase China's iron mines, Japan, in the 
midst of an acute financial impasse under the burden of the paramount 
needs of armament replenishment on the eve of an impending war with 
Czarist Russia, in the spring of 1903 boldly embarked upon concluding an 
agreement with China on a loan to Tayeh mines. In November that year, 
the Industrial Bank of Japan moved to loan a sum of 3 million yen aga-
inst the sceurity comprising the Tayeh mines and its attached installations 
(at 6 % interest rate per annum fora term of 30 years). The agreement 
stipulated that" for the duration of that period the Tayeh mines shall 
not be leased or ceded, and have their ores be sold to foreign powers" 
and that "the Tayeh mines shall undertake over a period of 40 years to 
(10) China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War revealed that she had degenerated to a weak, 
decadent country, which invited foreign powers' competitive attempts at dividing her up. 
During the decade between the Sino..japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, the for-
eign powers concentrated their imperialistic adventures on the China mainland so that 
their cODfrontation on the European .Continent WaS seemingly temporarily slackened. 
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deliver to Yawata 17,000,000 ton of iron ores and 8,000,000 ton of pig 
iron". It was also stipulated that" the Japanese agency at Tayeh shall 
have the right of directing and supervising matters regarding the mining 
of ores". This was the first concrete step taken for a resultant . ad vance 
to China mainland of Japan's capita!.") 
However, the road leading to this was never. smooth and easy. The 
commencement of the operation of blast furnace at Yawata, in spite of 
the apparent settlement of the problem of raw materials following the 
purchase of the Tayeh mines, had to face a series of troubles immediately 
afterwards. The situation became so bad that the production of pig iron 
at Yawata had to be suspended between July, 1902 and July, 1904. Ac-
cording to a report compeilled by the committee for investigating iron 
manufacturing industry, which was set up by the government in the same 
year, the suspension was caused by various factors of miscalculation and 
miscarriage, including errors in the order of work, mistakes in budgetary 
and accounts arrangements and the improper way in which foreign engi-
neers were employed. The fundamental cause, however,· should be found 
in the immaturity, both economic and technical, on the part of the contem-
porary Japan and in the fact that Japan was at that time still so im-
mature in many respects that she was not accustomed to a reasonable 
management of the modern iron and steel industry. On the basis of the 
report, the government hastened to take appropriate measures to tide over 
the difficulty, and, in July, 1904, they were able to see the blast furnace 
put into operation again. It needs no explanation that the commence-
ment of the Russo.Japanese War demanded a speedy restoration of opera-
tion at Yawata as well as the loaning of the Tayeh iron mines. Japan's 
victory in the gigantic war against Russia stimulated a spectacular develop-
ment of Japanese economy, while the increasing demand, both military 
and economic, made it imperative that the Yawata Iron Works to be 
more and more expanded in scope and scale. The importance of this 
requirement is obvious in consideration of the fact that, in spite of the 
drastic increase in the wartime demand, the major portion of pig iron and 
steel needed in Japan had still to be imported from abroad. For instance, 
of the total domestic demand for 230,000 ton of pig iron in 1905, only 
80,000 ton were supplied by Kamaishi and other domestic factories, while 
domestic output of rolled steel stood at mere 70,000 ton against the 
demand of 450,000 ton. In 1906, a plan was formulated for doubling 
(11) With regards to the advance to China of Japan's spinning capital, it is noted that, after 
a failure in 1895, the Mitsui Yoko, in 1902, succeeded in buying up the Tasun Spinning 
Co. which later was re-named Shanghai Boshoku Daiichi-Sho. 
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the output at Yawata to 180,000 tons; the 22nd session of the Diet pas-
sed the budgetary appropriations of about ¥ 10,900,000, demanded by 
the government for the execution of the expansion program. The work 
for expansion was started in 1907 and was finished in 1909. In spite of 
the successive financial deficit at Yawata Iron Works, which had continued 
ever since the inauguration (the accumulative deficit up to 1909 since the 
inauguration stood roughly at ¥ 11,000,000), and, in the face of pessimistic 
views expressed regarding the future possibility of the industry as well as . 
the opinion urging the advisability of placing the industry under mono-
civilian control, the Yawata. continued under a powerful governmental 
poly, and this was entirely for the purpose of meeting those requirements, 
of which mention has been made in the preceding lines. Keeping pace 
with the expansion being effected at Yawata, more loans were advanced 
to Hanyang and Tayeh.12) 
In 1906, the Mitsui Bussan loaned 1,000,000 yen (at interest rate of 
9.5%, for 8-year term), and in 1907 the Okuragumi 2,000,000 yen, to Han-
yang and Tayeh. The latter subsequently loaned another 800,000 yen. 
In 1908, it was planned that Hanyang, Tayeh and Pingsiang (coal mines) 
be amalgamated so that a streamlined management be made possible 
covering raw materials, on the one hand, and the manufactured products, 
on the other. In order that a purely civilian commercial undertaking be 
initiated in the place of the old government-controlled enterprise, these 
three mines were duly amalgamated into the Han-yeh-ping Iron Works, 
Ltd., when the Yokohama Specie Bank in the same year moved to loan 
a sum of 2,000,000 yen (at interest rate of 7.5%, for 7-15 year term) to 
the newly-founded company. In 1910, another 2,330,000 yen was loaned 
(at interest rate of 7%, for 6-ll/year term) in an effort to frustrate the 
project being advanced by the Western Steel Company of Seattle and the 
San Francisco Shipping Company for the purchase of iron ores. Further, 
in 1911, keeping pace with the second expansion program being formulated 
at Yawata, the Yokohama Specie Bank, in March, the same year, loaned 
another 6,000,000 yen (at interest rate of 6%, for 4-15 year term). With 
the outbreak of the revolution in China in that year, the operation at the 
Han-Yeh-Ping was suspended temporarily. In the meantime, it was planed 
that the undertaking be placed under a joint Sino-:Japanese management, 
and, a sum of 3,000,000 yen, it is recorded, was advanced as part of a 
(12) After 1910, the Yawata ceased to show del1cit. This was entirely due to the following 
facto.: (I) import of low-priced iron ores; (2) nonpayment of interest and taxes; (3) 
postponement of the redemption of the fixed capital and (4) non payment of dividends 
on the grounds that the organization was directly under State control. 
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loan to tha(company through the Yokohama Specie Bank. It was, indeed, 
advanced to the revolutionary regime for military funds by the Mitsui 
Bussan. Later, in 1912 6,000,000 yen was loand, followed by 15,000,000 
yen loaned in 1913. The aggregate of the loans since the first loan was 
advanced, reached the big sum of 31,650,000 yen"l, constituting 26% of 
the total Japanese investments in China, excepting Manchuria. While 
these investments were made for the supply of the ores .but also for pig 
iron, the fact that all these loans were advanced to a single enterprise is 
to be noted with special attention. And, it should be noted, also, in this 
connection, that this foreshadowed the conclusion in 1915 of the notorious 
21-article pact with China. 
It is hoped that the foregoing lines have made it clear the fact that, 
at this stage of development, the monopolistic capitalists of modern Japan 
closely aligned themselves with the nationalistic moves of the government 
as was seen in their positive attitude in advancing successive loans to· the 
Chinese corporation. Ostensively loaned by certain specific banks, the 
funds advanced to China actually constituted government funds, and this 
fact, which is highly significant, is what distinguishes Japan's new moves 
in China from those at the time of 'the Sino.]apanese War. Japan's 
acquisition of iron ores produced in China meant not only that she was 
thus enabled to move ahead toward a further substantial replenishment 
of her military and economic power but also that her powerful financial 
cliques, known as the Zaibatsu, obtained a foothold for making inroads 
in China. It was said that Mitsui's loaning 0[3,000,000 yen to the Chinese 
revolutionary regime, mentioned earlier, carried a tacit agreement not only 
on re-modelling the Han-Yeh-Ping into a joint Sino.] apanese concern, but 
also on granting special priority concessions to the Mitsui with regard to 
the construction of railways, development of the mining and electricity 
industries and other enterprises which would be undertaken by the Revo-
lutionary regime. japan's military requirements happily combined with 
the desire to seek profit on the part of the Zaibatsu, and the result was 
that Japan embarked on a vigorous and ambitious process of colonization 
of China. It will be noticed here, further, that Japan's early capitalism, 
in these undertakings, unmistakably manifested its characteristics feature 
in which its aggressive property - the moves of her financial capitalists 
- was partially replaced and partially supplemented by the absolutist 
government. It is significant, in spite of all this, that, here, too, the prin-
(13). To this aggregate total of loans, repayment' was made partially, the exact figure of which, 
however, is unknown. Payment of interest, too, was in arrears, but the entire amount, 
including both ~he capital and interest, is not known. 
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cipal role was played by the government. Ever since the MeijiRestoration; 
the leadership and protection afforded by the government capital had :ahvays 
been mainly instrumental in pushing head the modernization of Japan, 
for, at that time, almost no private capital was accumulated and; n'aturally, 
could not well afford to embark upon major scale oven:easinvestrrientg. 
Under the circumstances, investmnets covering a lengthy period of time and 
undertaken under an unstable condition, had still to be'made under the 
leadership of the government capital. And, it should be noted that such was 
not because the internal capital was overabundant but because of an 'ur-
gent stimulation spurred on by military requirements.: ' 
c.) Form of Investment and Sources of Investment: 
The big tremendous loans to Tayeh were all in the form of advances 
against its factory installatson and other equipment offered as a' security. 
Jap;l.ll was already executing her right of directing and supervising the 
mining of iron ores at Tayeh by dint of the stipulation of the 1894 con-
tract. Such, however, was not deemed sufficient, and Japan desired to 
place the mines under her direct control. And, for this purpose, repeated 
attempts were made to place the concern under a joint Sino:Japanese 
management, which, however, ended in failure each time the attempt was 
made. In 1908, Sheng HSiian-hwai, in conjunction with Japan, attempted 
to organize a joint Sino:J apanese enterprise. But, his attempt could not suc-
ceed because the Foreign Capital Law, then in force in China, prevented 
it. In 1910, the Law was so amended that foreign capital would beal-
lowed to be introduced up to one half of the capital involved. Talks for 
Sino:Japanese joint undertaking, then, progressed without a hitch between 
Sheng and Japan, until, however, the project had to end in a failure in 
the face of a rapid surgence of a racial movement among the Chinese 
people and, at the same time, being obstructed by German interests which 
had been vested in Tayeh. ' 
The Chinese people, but not the compradore-capitalists, aspired for 
a racial independence of China. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 put an 
end to Sheng'S plan to work with the Japanese, while japan's desire in 
tne same line, for which she had been given a secret understanding asa 
price for having loaned military funds to the Chinese Revolutionaries, 
could not be realized ¥I the face of a fast aggravating popular movement 
in China for regaining her lost national prestige, which, combined with 
various obstructionist moves by foreign powers, forestalled, Japan's ambi-
tions on the China mainland. With the advance of another big loan ef-
fected in 1913, Japan moved to dispatch to Tayeh a highest adviser and 
a financial adviser charged with the supervision of the projected expansion 
THE GROWTH OF IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY IN JAPAN 33 
projected expansion program. Plan to place the concern under a joint 
Sino:J apanese management, however, could not again be materialized. 
Japan's failure in this regard, as is seen in the foregoing lines, was par-
tiaUy due to the recognition, on the part of the awakening Chinese, of the 
awakening· Chinese, of the military and economic importance of the Han-
Yen-Ping Mines, and partiaUy, to the persistent interference made by the 
foreign powers. 
Now, where was the source of these loans from the nation's treasury 
to be found? The loan advanced by the Industrial Bank of Japan in 1894, 
amounting to 3,000,000 yen, was made against the security in the form of 
debentures issued by that Bank which was taken over by the Finance 
Ministry. This loan was later made throngh the Yokohama Specie Bank, 
a special Government Bank. The loans advanced by the Mitsui and Oku-
ra, likewise, were subsequently taken over by the Financial Ministry so 
that they nominaUy were made by the Yokohama Specie Bank. Thus, it 
is seen that all of these loans had to be financed by the Department of 
Deposit of the Finance Ministry. Question now arises where did the 
Department of Deposit find the source for all these funds advanced to 
China?· The answer is clear: the source for the major portion of these 
funds, 80%, was found in the postal savings by destitute farmers, merch-
ants and laborers. Their meagre incomes, deposited at the post offices 
throughout the country, were comparable in amount to bank deposits. It 
is said that in 1919 the amount of investments in China financed by the 
Department of Deposit was no less than 50% of the total funds deposited 
there;") 
That the Department of Deposit fund was, thus, utilized for Conti-
nental investments was important from two aspects. It worked, indirectly, 
to lessen the abnormal expansion of the national budget seen after the 
Sino:Japanese War, because it was in a form of voluntary formation of 
the financial fund. The result was that private capital accumulation was 
spared from burden of the issuance of goverment bonds, and increased 
taxes, resulting from such abnormal expansion of the governmental expen-
ditures. The urge for the accumulation of capital in order to compete 
with advanced Western Powers had to be constrained by the prevailing 
poverty at this time of industrial expansion, and a shortage of capital 
had ever to be closed up. The situation was further aggravated as, with 
(14) The major part of the fund available at the Department of Deposit was used for invest .. 
ment in China through medium of the Bank of Taiwan, the Bank of Chosen, the Yoko-
hama Specie Bank, the South Manchuria Railway Co. and the Drien'tal Development 
Co., While the remainder was invested in National bonds. 
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the adoption of the gold standard system, which checked the capital ac-
cumulation through inflation policy. And, in so far as this was concerned, 
the needs for armament expansion and the consequent swelling of national 
budget, calling for increased taxes and successive issuance of government 
bonds, had always to fight against the chronic shortage of capital.· Under 
the circumstances, the mobilization of the Department of Deposit fund was, 
in effect, as effictacious as a two-edged sword in that it helped to embark 
upon the required national investments overseas without ever unduly op-
pressing private capital. Secondly, from the view point of original sup-
plier of the fund, it was not only a voluntary contribution to the gover-
nment but the fund was not used for their benifit but for the benifit of the 
government. 
Lastly, mention must be made of the fact that the export of state 
capital in the from of the Department of Deposit fund loaned, saw a 
drastic increase in amount after the Russo]apanese War. This was seen 
not only at Tayeh. While Japan's acquisition after the Sino]apanese 
War of special rights for launching industrial enterprises in the Chinese 
territory had opened up the possibilities of investing for such pruposes, 
the cases of big-scale investment actually undertaken there up till the time 
of the Russo] apanese War included, merely, the inauguration of the Shang-
hai Spinning Corporation by the Mitsui in 1902 and the loans advanced 
to· Tayeh two years later.") 
This was, of course, partly because the pressure exerted by foreign 
powers worked to obstruct Japan's advances.!·) 
It was, at the same time, due to the circumstances that, because of 
the rapid post-war economic development coupled by the inevitable expan-
sion of national finances spurred on by the continued need for increased 
armament, Japan could not well afford to invest overseas on any major 
scale. At this stage of development, the Department of Deposit fund was 
(15) In Chosen (Korea), cases of the construction, for purely purposes, of the Seoul-Inchon 
railway line in 1901 with the aid of a government subsidy, and of the Seoul-Pusan railway 
line, in 1904, with military fund, as well as the unneglectable activity of the Korea branch 
of the Daiichi Bank, may be cited. These, however, are simply negligible compared with 
the heavy government investments in the years after the end of the Russo-] apanese War. 
(16) While it i.s a fact that Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War opened .the way for 
a competitive inroads in .China of Western Powers, it may not be denied that Japan's 
position was not entirely "envialbe. Not only because of Japan's inability to raise sufficient 
capitaJ, hut also because of the strong pressure exerted by Western Powers, especially Rus~ 
sla, Japan, as .far as her advances in China were concerned. had to be relegated to the 
background. Only Japan's acquisition in subsequent years of a role of watchdog for Bri~ 
tain, enjoying the largest interests there, against the aggresive Russia, offered her an op-
portunity to emba~k upon a more active move in China. 
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mostly being appropriated to cover government bonds. What, then, was 
the factor which rendered it possible that the fund be eventually mobilized 
for overseas investment? 
d.) Import of Foreign Capital 
While the payment by China af an indemnity amounting to 564,000, 
000 yen as a consequence of her defeat in the Sino-Japanese War enabled 
Japan to adopt the gold standard, the real intention of Japan in adopting 
the system was to induce foreign capital through the resultant stabilization 
of her foreign exchange and the strengthening of her links with the inter-
national monetary market.") 
The introduction of foreign capital to Japan was also required for the 
purposes of accelerating the speed of the accumulation of capital and sti-
mulating the expansion of financial fund. The government which, ap-
prehending the liability of placing the nation under foreign domination 
as a result of foreign capital introduced, had held a position opposing such 
introduction of foreign fund,") had now to recognize the necessity of such 
procedure, and, as a prelude to such eventuality, decided on the enforce-
ment of the gold standard. Then, steps were taken by the government 
for founding the Industrial Bank of Japan in 1902 for dual purposes: to 
forestall, on one hand, unrestrained and unjustified imports by the still-
weak domestic capital, and, on the other, to preclude the possibility that 
the domestic industries, especially the construction of railways with high 
military importance, be subjected to the sway of foreign money. This was 
virtually a measure intended to prepare a reasonable layout for receiving 
foreign money being brought in. The amount of foreign capital actually 
introduced during the period following the Sino-Japanese War up to the 
Russo-Japanese War, however, only amounted to 194,865,000 yen (as at 
the end of 1903), the major part of which comprising loans by the govern-
ment. 
(17) While the adoption of the gold standard was intended for the stabilization of her 
currency and the intoduction of foreign capital, the enforcement' of such system in an 
underdeveloped country, it is noted, is liable to make it inevitable for that country to 
depend on foreign capital and, consequently, on the international monetary situation. 
This particular point has so far not been fully elaborated, but the import and implications 
of the tendency should not be overlooked, fOf, as the country involved is forced to main-
tain -the. gold standard as an institution, it may not be in a position to satisfy the motives 
of acuDlulation through an inflation of the l':1n'renl':Y wil1 at once bring about gold con .. 
version, a nominal rise of commodity prices, increased imports and flow overseas of gold, 
which, in turn, will tend to undermine that institution itself. 
(IS) The principal foreign loans effected up to 1903 comprised: 1,000,000 pound British 
loan with 9% interest in 1870; 2,220,000 pound British loan with 7% interest in 1873. 
Some foreign investments, were made in, the foreign· settlement~, which,· however, were 
gradually liquidated by the govern~ent. 
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The factor which caused foreign capital investement into Japan to be 
limited to such a small amount was the fact that, with a war with Russia 
being considered imminent, Japan failed to offer a stable and safe market 
alluring it. The foreign capital, however,. it· should be noted, helped to 
facilitate the expansion of national expenditure caused by the speedy 
replenishment of Japan's military .preparedness, and, on the other hand, 
ameliorate the tightening financial situation. This made it possible for 
Japan's industrial capitalists to establish themselves on a stable and pro-
gressive foundation and, then, to attain a pre-monopolistic status. Japan's 
emergence as a " British watchdog" in the East Asia as a result of tlie con-
clusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 and the introduction of 
foreign capital in the same year, as mentioned above, offered ample con-
ditions for the abovementioned subsequent advance of Japanese capital in 
spinning and iron industries (Tayeh) in China. This fact is highly signi-
ficant, for, but for such preliminary preparation,Japan's control of the iron 
ore resources at Tayeh would have been simply impossible not only for 
economic reasons but also on account of obstructive interferences by foreign 
powers, especially Germany, which, then, held definite interests in Hanyang 
and Tayeh. Seen from this angle, japan's advance to Tayeh, in the Eng-
lish eye, meant an extremely important move for checking further· advances 
by Russia and Germany. Generally, however, this important aspect is apt 
to be overlooked. 
Now, Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War induced much foreign 
money to Japan. It should not be overlooked, however, that the war could 
be fought only by aid of about 800 milion yen loaned from Britain. The 
foreign loans shouldered by Japan, which had amounted to 190,000,000 
yen or so at the end of 1903, rose to no less than 1,850,000,000 yen toward 
the end of 1911, and to 1,960,000,000 yen by the and of 1913. On the 
basis of such enormous borrowed foreign money could Japan embark upon 
a vast-scale investment in Korea and China on on the heels of her victory 
in the war against Russia, and, against such background was a POSItIve 
Japanese investment in Tayeh possible. Japan, indeed, was not able to 
wage war by herself nor was she in a position to export capital without 
help from outside. And, in so far as this preposition held good, Japanese 
imperialism, indeed, was one subservient to a stronger imperialism of foreign 
nations. 
e.) Effect of Japan's Securing of Overseas Resources: 
It has already been pointed out that Japan's adventure at Tayeh was 
entirely for the purpose of strengthening her military power and of acqui-
ring materials for her expanding productive industry. While her succes-
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sive loans to Tayeh were never primarily intended for profit only, the 
economic motives underlying these loans were at the same time never overlo-
oked. So long as Tayeh offered a springboard. for further acquistion of 
economic concessions in China on the part of Japan, the price paid for .these 
loans was not exhorbitant, for they at once enabled her to satisfy both 
iron ores and economic requirements in the form of the supply of cheap 







Amount of Ores supplied to Yawata 
(1,000 ton) 
China Ratio of 
Domestic Korea (Tayeb) Tayeh 
24 3 70 70 % 
23 18 110 73 
12 127 262 65 






Remarks: (1) Despite the remarkable increase of ores from Korea, the predominant' 
position of Tayeh remains unaltered. 
(2) The marked decrease of the supply of domestic ores in proportion to 
the increase of supply from overseas territories should be noted. 
Keeping pace with the expansion of installations at Tayeh, the Ya-
wata, consequent upon the rationalization of its operation aided by bigger 
financial appropriations19) and an overall state protection, was by degrees 
enabld to manufacture pig iron comparable in quality with foreignimpor-
ted one,") while, in respect to steel production, likewise, the qualitative 
(19) Rationalization of 
Blast Furnace Operation at Yawata 
No. of 
Blast Averate daily output Amount of cokes per 
Year Furnaes for furnace ton of pig j ron 
(ton) (ton) 
1901 I 82 1.63 
1907 2 132 1.13 
1912 3 162 1.02 
1914 4 177 1.03 
(20) Comparison of Pig Iron Production Cost 
in Japan & U. S. A. in 1909 
(Unit yen per ton) 
Main-
Steam Labor tenance 
Ores Cokes Coal cost cost cost Various Total 
Yawata II. 885 11.635 0.370 0.588 I. 512 0.715 I. 713 28.422 
U. S. A. 14.600 7.780 0.860 0.240 I. 540 0.680 2.320 28.020 
38 K. ONO & H. NAMBA 
level of foreign-manufactured steel was being speedily approached. This 
means that the Yawata was headed toward a stabilization as far as its 
managerial operation was concerned, while its rapid growth amply ]lro-
mised a brighter future prospect for the steel industry in Japan. (Table 8) 
Table 8 (Unit 1.000 ton) 
I 190 I I I 9 I 4 
Pig iron I Rolled steel I Pig iron I Rolled steel 





Domestic 57 6 300 283 
In 1899] apan effected a comprehensive revision of her tariff rates, 
and this made it possible for her to free herself from a semi-colonial bon-
dage which had bound her for years ever since the Meiji Restoration. 
This singularly coincided with] apan's advance to China, bold and resolute, 
iu a sustained effort to colonize that backward country. This adventure, 
it is. noted, was possible only on the basis of her firmly-founded basic 
of her firmly-founded basic industries and a spectasular strengthening of 
her military power. On the· other hand,]apan at this stage was destined 
to witness a speedy industrialization of her capitalism, an extensive modi-
fication of her industrial setup, and. in turn, the formation of a full-fledged 
financial capitalism. 
This process, meanwhile, produced the following consequences in China. 
That Tayeh constituted an indispensable supply base for Yawata was, in 
other words, to say that the fate of Tayeh (Han-Yeh~Ping) depended solely 




Tayeh Ores produced and exported to Yawata 
(1,000 ton) 
I 1901 I 1902 I 1904 I 1905 I 1908 I 
70 50 60 72 127 
Produced at 
Tayeh (B) 119 75 105 150 172 
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Table 10. 
Pig Iron produced at Hanyang Iron Works and Amount of 
Pig Iron exported· to Yawata 
(1,000 ton) 
I Output I Exports to Japan (Yawata) I Ratio 
1902 16 2 12 % 
1905 32 23 72 
1908 66 28 42 
1911 83 57 70 
This, on the other hand, benefited Han-Yeh-Ping capitalists. In his 
classic book on the mining industry of China, Collins says that the Chinese 
apparently could accrue benefit, in undertaking the mining enterprise, 
from what the Japanese iron works paid for the ores supplied. This fact 
eloquently bespeaks the propensity of capitalists in general, who never 
shrink from the probability of being degraded to the status of, even, a 
comparador provided that a certain margin of profit was assured. 
The successive borrowings from Japan and the selling of their ores 
at a low price level, on the other hand, unavoidably compelled the Chinese 
capitalists to seek a meager margin of profit in forcing the laborers to 
work for low wage and under worsened labor conditions, for such was the 
only alternative available for them to partake in the Imperialistic lion's 
share. Therefore, the rise and decline of the Yawata was at once their 
own rise and decline, and, in so far as this bond existed, they were mu-
tually and inseparably related to each other. 
Then, why were there successive investments (an accumulation of loans 
as seen from the Chinese side) untlertaken? The reason for this should 
be found in the fact that the low price level at which the ores sold 
worked to restrict the margin of profit. The lion's share on their 
part was never plenty, and on the other hand, the capital accumulation 
required to meet the ever-mounting demand of Yawata was blocked by the 
very Yawata. They, however, had nothing to complain about the accu-
mulating loans, no matter what they brought about in their train, so far 
as they meant an improvement as well as replenishment of the production 
facilities, and, in turn, the absolute amount of profit accruing therefrom. 
Speaking from a different angle, this, again, meant that the Yawata, 
in its sustained effort to expand its production facilities as well as improve 
• them, both qualitatively and quantitatively, with a view to successfully 
competing with the Western Powers, was inevitably forced to invest suces-
sively in Han-Yeh-Ping. 
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The accumulation of loans by Japan signified not only cementing of 
her diret control but also that the entire range of China's modern mining 
and iron manufacturing industries fell into the hand of the unsatiable 
imperialism of the rising Japan. It further paved the way for a marked 
increase of japan's exports to China, while, on the other hand, China 
exported more and more raw materials. This, again, was accompanied 
with the inevitability that China found it difficult to have its racial industry 
found it difficult to have its racial industry promoted as cheap capitalis-
tically-manufactured commodities continued to flow in. China's attempt 
at industrialization, thus, was seriousely blocked, while her obsolete feu-
dalistic institution were allowed to remain. These were the factors which 
made China so dependent on foreign countries in regard to industrial com-
modities and means of production. And, this worked to further the semi-
colonial status of China, which, for subsistence, had to export raw materials 
in exchange for the import of finished goods.'!) 
Further, the accumulated loans to China were effectively utilized by 
Japan for taking hold of various other economic interests in that country. 
Of course, instrumental in this were some other factors in addition to 
Tayeh. It cannot be denied, however, that Tayeh played the role of a 
lever in this regard. It is seen, from the above, that Japan's successful 
emergence from a humilating position of subservience to foreign influence 
to the status of a modern industrial country coincided with the accentua-
tion of the process of colonization of China. It should be noted, however, 
that Japan's emergence from such position was never perfect in that she 
had ever to rely on foreign money. In this sense, Yawata's rise may be 
said to have eloquently exemplified the inherent contradictions Japan had 
to carry-subservience and aggression.' 
Now, our chronological survey of Japan's endeavor through years to 
secure the supply of raw materials required for rising industries should be 
complemented by a description of her similar adventures made, in an 
intensified manner, in Manchuria and Korea following her victory in the 
Russo.Japanese War, for the very crux of her aggressive ambitions on the 
Continent existed here. In the years under our survey, however, Tayeh 
was the central figure in relation to Japan's effort to take control of ore 
resources in China. With Tayeh serving as a springboard for further 
aggressive moves, Japan was enabled to embark upon more ambitious 
21) Japan's trade with China rose to ¥170,OOO,OOO in value from ¥36,OOO,OOO during the 
1897-1912 period. The ratio of increase, 4.7 times, was far above that of general trade 
increase, which stood at 3.2 times. In 1913, Japan's export to China consistented 21 'Yo of 
total imports of China, ranking first among all other foreign countries. 
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adventures, military and economic, in Manchuria and Korea. 
f.) Korea and Manchuria: 
It has already been stated that, after the Russo.Japanese War, Japan 
launched upon ambitious programs of acquiring ore resources in Korea 
and Manchuria. Korea's colonization following Japan's victory in her war 
with Russia opened the way for Yawata to reach the iron mines at Inritsu 
and Tainei in 1907. This marked the first important step in the role the 
Korean ores had to playas far as the supply of the ores to Yawata was 
concerned, for, ever since this time, they were destined to playa big part 
in this regard side by side with the ores supply by China. (Refer Table 
7). At about the same time, the Mitsubishi, which had been eagerly lo-
oking for promising mines on the West coast of Korea, moved in 1911 to 
buy up a mine near Kenjippo. 
In Manchuria, the task was in charge of the South Manchuria Railway 
Company, founded in November, 1906. In 1909 it discovered vast iron 
deposits at Anshan. Upon close survey and formulation of detailed plans 
of expl()i,tation, the big organization energetically launched upon an ambi-
tious scheme aimed at manufacturing iron. The Okura, another of the 
big Zaibatsu clique, meanwhile, founded in 1911 an iron manufacturing 
company at Penshihu. 
Through these processes, a concrete national system for manufacturing 
iron and steel was in steady making. 
